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THE EBAY EXEMPTION: RESTRUCTURING THE
TRADEMARK SAFE HARBOR FOR ONLINE
MARKETPLACES
Connie Davis Powellt
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the Internet as a global mega-mall/auction house with
infringing and counterfeit goods sold routinely raises many concerns
with trademark owners and Internet auction sites alike. As a result of
the growth of the sale of counterfeit goods online, Internet auction
sites, such as eBay, have developed policies which attempt to curtail
the sale of infringing merchandise. Despite these efforts, Internet
auction sites remain a preferred distribution channel for infringing
and counterfeit goods online. Predictably, these sites have been
subject to trademark infringement suits for counterfeit articles sold by
users of their services. While a few cases cite direct trademark
infringement, the primary theory of liability advanced by trademark
holders against these Internet auction sites is secondary trademark
infringement. However, the rules for determining liability for
secondary trademark infringement against these Internet auction sites
are ambiguous at best. To date, no Internet auction site has been held
liable in the United States under secondary liability theories of
trademark infringement. Notwithstanding the analysis by courts
reviewing these cases has been inconsistent, providing little guidance
on the application of the standards for secondary liability under the
Lanham Act.
This Article argues for revisions to the Lanham Act that will
establish a principled scheme for liability. First, the Article discusses
the development of the counterfeit trademark market online and
provides a brief synopsis of the major Internet auction sites' response
to the developing counterfeit market. Second, the Article provides an
overview of the current legal framework for establishing secondary
liability for trademark infringement. Next, the Article discusses
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secondary liability suits involving eBay, the largest online
marketplace and evaluates the courts' rationale in finding eBay not
liable for secondary trademark liability. The Article concludes with a
discussion of Senate Bill 3804, "The Combating Online Infringement
and Counterfeits Act", and its pitfalls; followed by a proposal for
additions to the Lanham Act to establish a "notice and take down"
system for trademark infringement. If the recommendations of this
Article are codified, a more predictable and principled scheme is
established for holding Internet auction sites, as well as other Internet
intermediaries, liable for trademark infringement without shifting the
obligation of the trademark owner to police their trademark to the
Internet intermediary.
II. COUNTERFEIT SALES STATISTICS AND INTERNET AUCTION
RESPONSES
Trademark infringement and counterfeiting1 online accounts for
roughly $30 billion of lost revenues annually.2 Roughly ten percent of
the total counterfeit market, which is estimated to be around five to
seven percent of world trade, occurs online . Based on these statistics,
Internet auctions have undoubtedly become the most popular
distribution channel for counterfeit goods.4 Indeed, a report from the
National Fraud Information Center indicates that Internet auctions are
amongst top reported fraud online in 2007.5 In 2008, one in four
I. A "counterfeit mark" is defined by the Lanham Act as "a spurious mark which is
identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark." 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2006). Similarly, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 defines a counterfeit mark as:
[A] spurious mark - (i) that is used in connection with trafficking in goods,
services ... (ii) that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from a
mark registered on the principal register . . . (iii) that is applied to or used in
connection with [those] goods or services ... (iv) the use of which is likely to
cause confusion,... mistake, or to deceive ....
18 U.S.C. § 2320(e)(1)(A) (2006). See also infra note 2.
2. See Comm. on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, Online Auction Sites and
Trademark Infringement Liability, 58 THE REC. 236, 238 (2003), available at
http://www2.nycbar.org/Publications/record/spring%202003.pdf [hereinafter Online Auction
Sites].
3. Id.
4. See Statement on the Green Paper on Consumer Protection, INT'L TRADEMARK
ASS'N (Jan. 15, 2002),
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consint/safe-shop/fair-buspract/greenpap comm/responses/b
usinessothers/inta.pdf.
5. 2007 Top 10 Internet Scams, NAT'L CONSUMERS LEAGUE FRAUD CENTER,
http://www.fraud.org/intemet/2007intemet.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) (reporting that 13%
of the fraud reported online is auction fraud with an average consumer loss of $1,370).
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complaints received by the Internet Crimes Complaint Center
involved Internet auction fraud.6
In recognition of these statistics, major online auctioneers
adopted policies that prohibit the sale of counterfeit merchandise on
their sites.7 In addition to these policies, many online marketplaces8
6. Online Auction Fraud Don 't let it Happen to You, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(June 30, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/une09/auctionfraud_063009.html.
7. See Online Auction Sites, supra note 2 ("[A]nticipating the threat of legal action by
trademark owners for secondary infringement, virtually all auction sites have crafted their legal
terms in efforts to avoid such liability"). Table 1 below summarizes the major auction sites'
policies regarding the sale of counterfeit goods and intellectual property rights.
TABLE 1. Auction site policies on counterfeit goods and intellectual property rights
Site her of Counterfeit Goods Policy lntellectuel Property Rights Policy
eBay Counterfeit tem listings my be ended early by nBay, and the seller
my be subject to argn ofoher actions including restrictions of
his buying and selling pivieges and suspension oflus accoun. See
Year UserAgreerent, nBA (Sep.7, 2010).
hotp //peges ehay.ooni/hel p plioiestss rg eentrheel (Abusing
eBay).
Bid Bid.om my iediately issue a arning, temporarily
suspend, indefinitely suspend on tenninate your acces to
tbe Site and refsse to provide setu.cr to you: (a) if you
breach this User Agreemcnt or the dosconts it
iscorporaies by reference; (b) if Bid corn is unable to
verify or authenticate any inforation you provide to
Bid coa; or (c) if Bid.cor believn ihat your actions
ay cause legal liability for yeu, other Bide.com users,
or Bid.on
Site Access and P-hr e Agreeint BiDoz M 5.2,
hp://, kout.bide.omsitel1/ cotent/t (lat visited Sept.
23,2011).
nnck The site rescesa the ight to t eenae ny listing or transction
involng any ite that is coaterfe or stolen. See T,- nd
Conditionts, OoRnocK.com (Aug. 11, 2011),
hotps:Ibelp oveesitokcooappfanswerlSdetaia bid/63 (Online
Conduct)
Ottie- The inforaiton a seller provides 'shall not violate ay sin, stature,
Auction ordinace, or regulation (including eithout limiting these govring
report contrnl, consener prtetin, unfair competition, asi-
discrimntion or false advertising)". Action Pehies,
ONcsocnau comt,
hbpJ/e.uonlinuuction.ecen?page=belp:nin&cntent=polimir
(Int visited Sept. 24,2011) (Your Given ieforlarion). "[Onlne
Aucion] may teinte yos User eligibility nd ny of your csrt
auctions i febdatelyifyoahhtheseplicieseetfe areble
t orver authnenicate my information yeu prvid o us." Id
(Broach)
We~de This web-sir
my rerinat ay action or use of the serite
inuerdistely and witheet notice if (a) We believe that
you n at anding by the gmcral tres of this web-sit
(b) You have repeatedly bokon a certateree (c) You
hane listed a suspicions ite- (d) We believe you tu be a
non paying bidder. In most eses wen en auspet foul
play me will surpend your ncounsilisting whilst me
investigate frth rt lfcu investigation is conclusive then
your acnurt with us eill be terminated.
Tev end Condition, WEBmZ,
hop://.ebide.contstenms,page,cnrmt ages (let visited Sept.
24, 2011) (Rights To Suspend e Tenrin).
Verified Rights Ower (VeRO) Program allows rights oners to
report infringing goods. Reported infringing goods ee removed
from the site. See Your Usee Agreeent EBAY (Sept.7, 2010),
httpe//pages.ebay.cnmhelp/policiesluser ag eement.heel (Abusing
eBay).
You shall not upload, post or otherwis make a.ilable
on the Site soy msateril protected by copyright,
-ndemank or other proprietary right ithet the expr
peeissin of the noner of the copyright, trademark or
other proprietary right and the burden of demmining that
ay terial is nout protected by copyright rets with you
You shall be solely liable for any damage resulting from
any infbigetnent of cepyights, prepetray rights, or any
other harm esuling from such a submission. By
submitting nateial to ny pablie mea of the Site, you
atomatically grant, or taset that the ewer of such
material has repressly grared Bid.corm the reyutty-free,
perpetual, ieevocable, none-clusive right ard license to
use. reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, truslate and
distribute such mheal (in whole or in pat) wodida
and/or to mirpote it in other works in ay fon,
media or technology not kro or hereafter developed
for the fall term of my copyright bet eoy eist in such
moneral
SiteAcc tadP hedAgree t, Btho COM § 3.1,
hops://chrukoa.bidz.ceaslsiteIlgl/entient (less visited Sept.
23,2011).
The site resces the ight to terminate mny listing or transactin
involving any item that vlates or infringes the rights ofanother
person, including copyrights, trademark rights, publicity rights and
paeny rights. See fened Conditions, OVE-asocucoM (Aug.
11,2011),hoys/elp ouesmckcor/pp/uswersderaiha id/63
(letellevnal Property Infringement, Online Conduct).
The infeation a seller provides "I(]bell not infringe on any third
party's copyright, tndeark, patent, trade screts, proprietary rights,
rights of publicity o pricy". Auction Pohcti.
ONciNEAUcin cuM,
http:// .onlineauction.enrpsgrhlp: min&et en elicies
(loot visited Sept. 24, 2011) (Your Given Information) "[Online
Auction] may terminate yo User eligibility and any of yoa cure
auctions imediately if yen breach these policies o ifie se unable
to veify or autbnctiate my inforore you provide o us." Id
(Breach).
To file a notice of infringeme- with the web-site, aritten notice of
the fingng activity muse be se to WeBid. San Ifringernent
Poliy, Wome,
hotp:// eebide.com/custo rnpage,page.10,tpic id,coenteag
n (last visited Sept. 24, 2011) (Copyright Infringemant Policy).
Weide offer the WeBid Rights Ownes (WRO) Programn wbich
allows rights owner to pmvide their contat iformation, list their
protected intellectual propery, and report any autions that infringe
upon their intellectual pespey rights. Sac id (WRO [WebBide
Rights Ownnr Program).
8. As used herein, "online marketplaces" is used interchangeably with "Intemet
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have implemented monitoring programs, fraud filtering technology,
and hired staff to periodically search their sites for suspected listings
containing counterfeit goods.9 Despite the adoption of policies that
prohibit the sale of infringing and counterfeit merchandise and the
efforts at policing their systems for infringements, Internet auctions
are still plagued with trademark infringements and the sale of
counterfeit goods by end-users.10
The continued use of these websites for the sale of counterfeit
goods can be attributed to the anonymity of the buyers and sellers,"
the vast amount of transactions online' 2, the short timeframe' 3 in
which auctions/sales are conducted, and the ability of the end-users to
delete one account and immediately post under a different username
and email address. 14 These factors provide challenges to both the
online marketplaces and the trademark holders' efforts to hold the
end-users liable for direct infringements. Indeed, the anonymity of the
end-users and the perceived ineffectiveness of the Internet auction
sites' policies have spurred trademark holders to seek legal actions
against the Internet auction site itself under secondary liability
theories of trademark infringement. 15
III. THE SECONDARY LIABILITY PROBLEM
The application of the standards for secondary liability for
trademarks is complicated as it relates to the Internet. United States
courts have taken a stance that secondary liability for trademark
infringement is only available under the most rigorous standards. 6
auctions" as many of the Internet auction sites also function as markets where one can buy
goods at a stated set price.
9. See Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(explaining that eBay employs full-time staff as well as fraud engine filter technology, to
monitor the site for the sale of counterfeit goods).
10. See Statement on the Green Paper on Consumer Protection, supra note 4.
11. Id. Generally, limited information is collected in order to participate in online
marketplaces. See Hi! Ready to Register with eBay?, EBAY, http://www.ebay.com/ (click
"Register") (last visited Sept. 27, 2011) (requiring seller to provide first and last name, street
address, primary telephone number, email address, user ID and password, and date of birth); see
also New User Registration, WEBIDZ, https://www.webidz.com/register.php (last visited Sept.
27, 2011) (requiring seller to provide full name, address, phone number, date of birth, email
address, usemame and password).
12. See Online Auction Sites, supra note 2, at 23 8-39.
13. See Help, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/duration.html (last visited Sept. 27,
2011) (Selecting a Listing Duration).
14. See Hi! Ready to Register with eBay?, supra note 11.
15. See infra Part III.A-IV.
16. See infra Part IV.
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However, each of the courts that have opined on secondary liability
has taken a different approach to reach this conclusion.' 7 Neither the
Internet auctions nor the trademark holders have any true guidance to
determine when liability will attach. As a result, the stakeholders are
left to defend against and/or institute actions for trademark
infringement.
A. Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement
While direct infringement18 and dilution' 9 are prescribed in the
17. See infra Part Ill.A-IV.
18. The Lanham Act defines infringement as "use in commerce ... of a registered mark
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(l)(a) (2006). To prevail on a trademark infringement
claim,
a plaintiff must establish that (1) it has a valid mark that is entitled to protection
under the Lanham Act; and that (2) the defendant used the mark, (3) in
commerce, (4) 'in connection with the sale . . . or advertising of goods or
services,' (5) without the plaintiff's consent.
E.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406-07 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation
omitted). In addition to the aforementioned, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must
show that a defendant's use of that mark is likely to cause confusion. See 15 U.S.C. §
11 14(l)(a). The standard for determining trademark infringement is "likelihood of confusion."
See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). A defendant's use of a
trademark in connection with the sale or advertising of a good constitutes infringement if such
use is likely to cause consumer confusion as to the source of those goods or as to the
sponsorship or approval of such goods. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 11 14(l)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). In
determining whether a particular use is likely to cause consumer confusion, courts look to a
number of factors, including: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the proximity of the goods; (3) the
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) the similarity of marketing
channels used; (6) the degree of caution exercised by the typical purchaser; (7) the defendant's
intent; and (8) likelihood of expansion. See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348-49.
19. The Trademark Dilution Revision Act provides relief to owners of "famous"
trademarks who may bring an action for dilution under the Lanham Act. See generally
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312 (2006). Dilution differs
significantly from an infringement action in that the owner of the famous mark does not need to
prove a likelihood of confusion, but must establish that the mark is indeed famous. See 15
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, "a mark is famous if it
is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of
source of the goods or services of the mark's owner." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006). In
determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may
consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) the duration, extent, and geographic
reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or
third parties; (ii) the amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services
offered under the mark; (iii) the extent of actual recognition of the mark; and (iv) whether the
mark was registered. See id. In section 1125 of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, there are
three possible dilution scenarios. First, there is the injury to the value of the mark that is caused
by consumer confusion. See § 1125(a). Second, there is the injury that results from the
defendant's use of the mark in a way that detracts from the reputation of the mark, see §
HeinOnline  -- 28 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 5 2011-2012
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Lanham Act, the Lanham Act does not contain explicit language
establishing secondary liability for trademark infringement or
dilution. 20 Despite the absence of explicit language in the Lanham
Act, the Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc.2 1 found that "liability for trademark infringement
can extend beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the mark
of another., 22 Accordingly, when:
[A] manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.
23
The Seventh Circuit, in Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v.
Concessions Services, Inc.,24 extended the Inwood test and held that
the operator of a flea market could be held liable for trademark
infringement under secondary liability theories if he knows, has
reason to know, or is willfully blind to the infringement occurring on
his/her premises.25 In Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift
Shop, the court attempted to place limits on when a landlord could be
held liable for infringing acts of its tenants.26 The court opined that,
"A landlord is neither automatically liable for the counterfeiting of a
tenant, nor is the landlord automatically shielded from liability. The
question of liability depends on the circumstances., 27
Specifically, the limit as artfully crafted by the court in Polo
Ralph Lauren is: once a landlord has actual notice and knowledge of
the trademark infringement, the landlord has an obligation to take
I 125(c)(2)(C); and third, there is the diminution in the uniqueness and/or individuality of the
mark as a result of the defendant's use of a similar mark, see § 1125(c)(2)(B). Scenarios one and
three are best classified as "blurring", see id, while scenario two is best classified as
"tamishment," see § 125(c)(2)(C).
20. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-129 (2006).
21. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
22. Id. at 853.
23. Id. at 854.
24. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concessions Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir.
1992).
25. See generally id. This concept of liability under willful blindness was further
expanded in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996) and Polo
Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, 855 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
26. See generally Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, No. 93 Civ. 6783,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1647 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1996).
27. See id. at *2.
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"reasonable steps to rid the premises of the illegal activity."28 While
the limit of secondary liability after the Polo Ralph Lauren case
seemingly suggests that actual notice and knowledge of the infringing
activity is necessary to establish liability, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc.,29 the Ninth Circuit, citing Hard Rock Cafe, found
"willful blindness" sufficient to establish the "knowing" requirement
for contributory trademark infringement.30  Notwithstanding the
extension of Inwood, courts have repeatedly and cautiously explained
that while the concept of secondary liability is available for trademark
infringement, the standards are difficult to satisfy.31
When applying contributory trademark infringement to Internet
services, the determining factors for liability are the types of services
provided.32 In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,33 the
court found the domain name registrar was not liable under a
contributory trademark claim for simply registering a domain name
that was used to offer infringing products. The court concluded this
was too far removed from the actual infringing activity.34 Similarly, in
Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc.,35 an action under the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act 36 ("ACPA") against
registrants of domain names incorporating its trademarks, as well as
against the online auctioneer of domain names, for contributory
trademark infringement, the court made a distinction between an
auctioneer of domain names and that of an online marketplace:
Rather than offering a forum for whatever objects cyber-merchants
might wish to sell, however [Defendant] specializes in auctioning
Internet domain names... [by] providing a marketplace for buyers
and sellers of domain names ... [for which it] receives a fixed
28. See id. at *3.
29. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d 259.
30. See id. at 265 (finding that a swap meet that is supplying the marketplace for the
blatant trademark infringement cannot disregard the action of its vendors with impunity).
31. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984),
superseded by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2006),
as recognized in Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 941
(N.D. Cal. 2009); Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d
788, 806 (9th Cir. 2007).
32. See Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 414-17 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
33. See generally Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949
(C.D. Cal. 1997), afid, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
34. See id. at 967.
35. Ford Motor Co. v. GreatDomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
20111
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percentage of the price of any domains sold over its website.
37
The plaintiff argued application of the "flea market" analysis
used in Fonovisa and Hard Rock Cafe because the defendant provided
"the necessary marketplace" for the alleged cyber squatting.38 The
Eastern District of Michigan declined to extend this "flea market"
analysis to cyber squatting cases because of the heightened standard
of "bad faith intent" required by the ACPA. 39 The court stated,
"Because an entity such as Great Domains generally could not be
expected to ascertain the good or bad faith intent of its vendors,
contributory liability would apply, if at all, in only exceptional
circumstances. 4 ° While the court in this case did not find the
defendant liable for secondary infringement under the ACPA, Ford
Motor may support the argument in a pure contributory trademark
infringement action, that awareness by the operator of a website that
infringing materials are being sold or auctioned thereon is sufficient
for a finding of contributory infringement.
41To the contrary, in Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Associates,
the court found that an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") role was
distinguishable from that of a domain name registrar.42 Indeed, the
court concluded that an ISP "might be more accurately compared to
the flea market vendors in Fonovisa and Hard Rock Cafe" where
liability may attach.43 The court found that because the ISP provided
"the actual storage and communications for infringing material," it
had the ability to control and monitor the activities of the infringing
party, similar to the landlord of a flea market.44 And, like the brick
and mortar flea market, the ISP can be held liable for contributory
trademark infringement.45
The discussion of the major secondary liability cases above
illustrates that, the initial focal point of the analysis for secondary
liability for Internet services is how closely the service provided
resembles a "flea market". Once the court makes its threshold
evaluation, it then commences with the application of the factors
37. Ford Motor, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 639-40 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
38. See id. at 646.
39. See id. at 647.
40. Id.
41. Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
42. ld. at 416.
43. Id. at 416 (citation omitted).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 421-22.
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outlined in Inwood.4 6 It is the application of these factors that
continue to provide a somewhat fractured analysis. When is an
Internet service so similar to a "flea market" that it warrants treatment
like one? And, what requisite level of knowledge or behavior must a
service provider have under Inwood to be liable? As discussed below,
online marketplaces have eliminated the need for the court's initial
discussion of the similarities between the online service and a flea
market. Indeed, online marketplaces are in fact virtual flea markets
with an infinite abundance of goods, both legitimate and illegitimate
for purchase. Thus, rendering the focal point of whether the services
can be likened to a "flea market" obsolete. Indeed, an analysis based
upon the type of services is equally obsolete in an environment where
many types of services are offered by a particular service provider.
Many online marketplaces offer auctions, "buy now,' '47 and "direct
buy''48 shopping opportunities. As discussed in section I, these
marketplaces have become distribution havens for counterfeit
merchandise, despite the efforts of marketplaces.49
IV. THE EBAY CASES
eBay, the leading Internet auction site, has proved to be at the
heart of claims by trademark holders for infringement. Indeed, two
cases involving eBay,50 Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc.51 and Hendrickson v.
eBay, Inc.,52 highlight secondary liability as applied to an online
marketplace.
46. See infra pp. 11-12.
47. "Buy now" is an option available on many auction sites which allows the seller to set
a price that any purchaser wishing to bypass the auction can secure the item for the "buy now"
price. E.g., Help, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.comlhelp/sell/fixed-price.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2011) (Selling Using a Fixed Price).
48. "Direct buy" is also available where the marketplace itself is the seller and provides
the purchaser the ability to purchase directly from the marketplace or from individuals who are
using the services. E.g., Selling at Amazon.com, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/hep/customer/display.html/ref=hplnav-dyn?ie=UTF8&nodeld=2
00306550 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011) (Individual and Pro Merchant Selling Plans).
49. See Topic Portal Anticounterfeiting, INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION,
http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Pages/Anticounterfeiting.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2011)
(Counterfeits on the Internet).
50. It is important to note that in addition to trademark infringement actions against eBay,
unfair competition actions seeking to hold the online marketplace liable for the acts of its users
have been lodged. See Gentry v. eBay Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 828, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (finding eBay not liable for forged autographed sports memorabilia sold on
its site under the Communications Decency Act).
51. See, e.g., Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
52. See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
2011]
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As discussed supra in section III.A, Gucci seemingly expanded
secondary liability for trademark infringement to ISP and presumably
others by requiring the ISP to monitor its sites for potential
infringement.53 However, the court in Tiffany, pared back this holding
substantially.54 Unlike the Internet cases of the past involving domain
name registrars and ISP providing services, Tiffany represented a true
parallel between the brick and mortar world and cyberspace-it
involved the sale of counterfeit goods at a virtual flea market.55
Indeed, Tiffany represents the first case to apply secondary liability
principles to an online marketplace.56 The facts of the case were
simple. Tiffany Inc. sought to hold eBay liable for the infringing acts
of sellers that used the eBay marketplace to auction and sell
counterfeit goods bearing the TIFFANY marks.57 Tiffany alleged that
from the period of 2003 to 2006 hundreds of thousands of counterfeit
silver jewelry items were offered for sale on eBay's website.58 Tiffany
acknowledged that the individuals responsible for listing and selling
the items were the infringers but argued nevertheless that eBay had an
obligation to investigate and control the counterfeit sales of Tiffany's
precious jewelry in the coveted blue boxes. 59 Tiffany specifically
outlined eBay's duty as one that required eBay to: (1) preemptively
refuse to post any listing offering five or more items; and (2)
immediately suspend a seller upon learning of Tiffany's belief that the
seller had engaged in potentially infringing activity.
60
Contrary to Tiffany's assertions, eBay contended that it had no
obligation to monitor its site for counterfeits, but rather Tiffany had
53. See Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
54. See infra pp.1 1-12. See also Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d 463.
55. See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
56. While Tiffany is the first U.S. case to consider the question of secondary liability's
application to an online marketplace, several European courts have ruled on this issue. See, e.g.,
Tribunal de Commerce [Comm.][Commerce Tribunal] Brussels, July 31, 2008, A/07/06032,
Lancome Parfums Et Beaute v. eBay Int'l AG. (declining to hold eBay liable for counterfeit
cosmetic products sold through its website); see e.g., Tribunal de Commerce de Paris
[Commercial Court of Paris], Premiere Chambre B, June 30, 2008, 200677799, SA Louis
Vuitton Malletier v. eBay, Inc.. See generally Valerie Walsh Johnson & Laura P. Merritt,
Tiffany v. eBay: A Case of Genuine Disparity in International Court Rulings on Counterfeit
Products, 1 LANDSLIDE 22, (2008), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/landslidehome/intelproplandslideVOL I n2.html
(surveying European court decisions in trademark infringement cases brought against eBay).
57. See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
58. See id.
59. See id
60. See id at 488.
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the burden.61 Moreover, eBay pointed to its Verified Rights Owner
("VeRO") program, which provided a mechanism for Tiffany to
report sellers who have listed counterfeit items.62 eBay alleged that it
complied with the program and immediately removed listings that
were reported.63
The court's analysis of the contributory infringement claims of
Tiffany was based on the tests articulated by the Supreme Court in
Inwood64 and subsequent cases such as Lockheed Martin that
expanded contributory liability not only to products but services as
well. 65 Tiffany, however, proffered another theory upon which
liability should be assigned to eBay under the standard of the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 27.66 Under the
Restatement, a party is liable for contributory trademark infringement
when that party "fails to take reasonable precautions against the
occurrence of the third person's infringing conduct in circumstances
in which the infringing conduct can be reasonably anticipated.,
67
The court found that Tiffany's argument was foreclosed by the
decision in Inwood.68 The court commented that:
The Inwood majority, in response to Justice White's concurring
opinion, explicitly rejected the notion that it was endorsing the
"reasonable anticipation" standard, holding that "[i]f the Court of
Appeals had relied upon [the reasonable anticipation standard] to
define the controlling legal standard, the court indeed would have
applied a "watered down" and incorrect standard.
69
Accordingly, the court stated that its analysis would look first to
whether eBay provided the necessary marketplace for counterfeiting
and had direct control over the means of infringement.70 The court
looked at whether under the Inwood test eBay continued to supply its
61. See id at 469.
62. See id. at 487-88.
63. See id. at 488.
64. See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 501-02, 505-06. The test for contributory trademark
infringement articulated in Inwood requires: (1) the intentional inducement by a manufacturer or
distributor of another to infringe a trademark; or (2) the continued supply of its product or
services to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).
65. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal.
1997), affd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 505-06.
66. See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (1995).
68. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d. at 502.
69. Id. at 502-03 (citing Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854) (brackets in the original).
70. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d. at 506.
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services to one whom it knew or had reason to know was engaging in
trademark infringement.71
The court found that while eBay definitively provided the
marketplace for the counterfeit Tiffany goods and eBay exercised
sufficient control and monitoring of its service, eBay was not liable
for contributory trademark infringement. 72 The court reasoned that the
standard for contributory trademark infringement was not whether
eBay could anticipate possible infringement as indicated by the
auctioning of five or more Tiffany items, but rather whether eBay
continued to supply its services to sellers when it knew or had reason
to know of the infringement by the sellers.73 The court further
commented that: "[t]he law does not impose liability for contributory
trademark infringement on eBay for its refusal to take such
preemptive steps. 7a The court concluded that the result of the
application of the legal standards articulated in Inwood and Lockheed
Martin leads to a result where Tiffany must ultimately bear the
burden of protecting its trademarks.75
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding.76 In
affirming, the Second Circuit made clear that generalized knowledge
of infringing activity was insufficient to provide a basis for liability
under Inwood.77 The court looked to the language of the Supreme
Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.,78 a copyright case, in which the Court compared secondary
copyright liability to secondary trademark liability, citing Inwood.
Indeed, the Court's dicta in Sony stated that if the narrow standard for
contributory trademark infringement found in Inwood governed, there
would be little merit in a contributory copyright claim because
Inwood required either intentional inducement or continued supply of
its products to "identified individuals known by it to be engaging in
continuing infringement., 79 The Second Circuit found the dicta to be
persuasive in establishing that specific knowledge of the counterfeited
goods was necessary to establish liability for contributory trademark
71. See id. at 507.
72. See id. at 463.
73. Id. at 469 (citing Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854).
74. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d. at 470.
75. See id.
76. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
77. Id. at 107.
78. Id. at 108-09 (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984)).
79. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (quoting Inwood, 456 U.S. at 855) (emphasis added).
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infringement. 80
Both the lower court and the Second Circuit's application of the
secondary trademark liability standards, while producing the optimal
result for eBay with respect to the secondary liability claims,
sidestepped the most important question raised by the case: what is
the secondary liability standard? The Second Circuit's opinion in the
case did not provide a clear roadmap that can be followed generally.
The discussion was eBay specific, leaving other online marketplaces
to ponder whether their practices are sufficient to withstand
challenges by other trademark holders. Finally, the Second Circuit
articulated a new and troubling standard for willful blindness.
8
'
Specifically, the Second Circuit stated "when [a service provider] has
reason to suspect that users of its services are infringing a protected
mark, it may not shield itself from learning of the particular
transaction by looking the other way. 8 2
This standard adds even more questions to the analysis of
secondary liability. What information leads a service provider to have
"reason to suspect" a user of infringing? Is a cease-and-desist notice
enough to establish a "reason to suspect"? There is no doubt that this
new standard obfuscates the court's position on general knowledge.
Hendrickson v. eBays3 represents yet another eBay case that
rejects liability for online marketplaces. Rather than addressing
secondary liability, the court looked to an obscure section of the
Lanham Act, section 32(2)(B). 4 Section 32(2)(B) of the Lanham Act
creates a limited safe harbor from trademark infringement for
publishers and online providers of content written by another.
85
Section 32(2)(B) provides in relevant part:
(B) Where the infringement or violation complained of is
contained in or is part of paid advertising matter in a newspaper,
magazine, or other similar periodical or in an electronic
communication as defined in section 2510(12) of title 18, the
remedies of the owner of the right infringed or person bringing the
action under section 1125(a) of this title as against the publisher or
distributor of such newspaper, magazine, or other similar
periodical or electronic communication shall be limited to an
80. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109.
81. Id. at 109-10.
82. Id. at 109.
83. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
84. Id. at 1095 (citing 15 U.S.C. § II 14(2)(B) (section 32 of the Lanham Act is codified
in 15 U.S.C. § 1114)).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(2)(B) (2006).
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injunction against the presentation of such advertising matter in
future issues of such newspapers, magazines, or other similar
periodicals or in future transmissions of such electronic
communications. The limitations of this subparagraph shall apply
only to innocent infringers and innocent violators.6
In Hendrickson, the owner of the rights to the documentary
Manson alleged that eBay and over a dozen other third-party sellers
violated its trademark rights under section 43 of the Lanham Act by
providing the site and facilities for the distribution of counterfeit
copies of Manson.F The claim by Hendrickson was premised on a
"printer-publisher" liability for trademark/trade dress infringement.88
The court in this case held that eBay was an "innocent infringer"
within the meaning of section 32(2) of the Lanham Act. 89 The court
reasoned since the undisputed facts showed that eBay had no
knowledge of a potential trade dress violation before Plaintiff filed
suit, eBay was an "innocent infringer." 90 As such, the Plaintiff was
limited to injunctive relief against the future publication or
transmission of the infringing advertisements on eBay's website.
91
eBay argued further that the plaintiffs need for an injunction
was unnecessary because it had stopped running all the
advertisements claimed to be infringing and had no intention of
running those advertisements in the future.92 Notwithstanding the
evidence presented by eBay establishing its removal, the plaintiff
argued that he was entitled to an injunction that restrained eBay "from
any further displaying and or transmitting of any false and or
misleading advertisements in connection with the sale/distribution of
'counterfeit' MANSON DVD's via its websites. ' 93 Essentially, the
plaintiff asked the court to issue an injunction that would enjoin any
and all false and/or misleading advertisements that may be posted on
eBay's website by users in the future, regardless of whether they were
86. Id. (the "Trademark Safe Harbor").
87. See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
88. See id.
89. See id
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. See also, e.g., Brown v. Armstrong, 957 F. Supp. 1293, 1302-03 n.8 (D. Mass.
1997) (Lanham Act false advertisement claim for injunctive relief based on false statements in
an infomercial was moot where the infomercial had stopped running and there were no plans to
air it in the future); Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., Inc., 127 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir.
1997) (grocery store operator's claim for declaratory judgment that it had priority in use of trade
name was moot where the competitor had announced that it would rename its stores).
93. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
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the basis of the lawsuit or have been identified by the plaintiff.
94
The court held that "no authority support[ed] Plaintiffs
position."95 "Indeed, such an injunction would effectively require
eBay to monitor the millions of new advertisements posted on its
website each day and determine, on its own, which of those
advertisements infringe Plaintiffs Lanham Act rights. 96 As the court
previously noted, "no law currently imposes an affirmative duty on
companies such as eBay to engage in such monitoring."97
The courts in both Tiffany and Hendrickson answered two
essential questions that were fundamental in a secondary liability
context: (1) were the actions/inactions of eBay sufficient to hold it
liable for the direct infringement and (2) was it just and prudent to
hold eBay liable based upon their actions/inactions.98 While both of
these questions were answered in the negative99, the underpinnings
for the courts' answers to the two basic questions are economics-
who is in the best position to determine infringement and will
innovators cease to create new media if they are potentially liable for
the actions of the end-users? It is important to highlight the economic
undertones of the eBay cases for two reasons. First, the modem view
of trademark protection is to promote economic efficiency °0 and to
provide an incentive to business to continue to develop the goodwill
in their products and services.' 0' Second, in order to continue to
justify the secondary liability doctrine, the courts in these cases
appear to reach for economics. In doing such, as poignant as the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. The application of secondary liability in the trademark context is markedly different
from its application in the copyright context. It is my position that the differences are not
insomuch as the origin of the two bodies of laws which have been used as justifications-
copyright founded in the United States Constitution while Trademark has pure common law
origins-but rather is more logically different because of the courts willingness to look at
economics in the trademark context and the ending result of a ruling of secondary liability
without compelling circumstances, Indeed the questions asked by the courts in the trademark
context are precisely the same as those in the copyright context. See Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) ("[T]he concept of contributory infringement is
merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to
hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.").
99. See, e.g., Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093-96; Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d 463,
505-08.
100. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987).
101. Id. at 269-70.
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opinions are, they do not provide clear and decisive guidance on
standards such that any precedential weight can be given. The effect
of these cases is to provide some persuasive value. Indeed, in the
lower court's holding in Tiffany the court punts the responsibility of
establishing a standard to the legislature. 10 2 The Second Circuit in
Tiffany closed the door on the secondary liability claim in its opinion
but opened the door for willful blindness claims without any guidance
on application of the "new standard."'
10 3
V. COMBATING ONLINE INFRINGEMENT AND COUNTERFEITS ACTS
Taking its cue from the cases and general statistics on online
infringements and counterfeits and the interested stakeholders1 °4 ,
Senate Bill S. 3804, entitled the Combating Online Infringement and
Counterfeits Act ("COICA") was introduced by Senator Patrick
Leahy on September 20, 2010 and subsequently approved by the
Senate Judiciary Committee on November 18, 2010.105 The current
version of the COICA authorizes the Attorney General to obtain,
upon application to a federal court, injunctions in rem against "the
domain name" of any Internet site "dedicated to infringing
activities."' 0 6 Under the COICA, an Internet site is "dedicated to
infringing activities" if: (a) it is "primarily designed," has "no
demonstrable commercially significant purpose or use other than," or
is "marketed by its operator," to offer goods and services in violation
of the Copyright Act and/or the Lanham Act, and (b) the site is
"engaged in" such infringing activities, and those activities, "taken
together," are the "central activities" of the site.'
0 7
The COICA is a step too far in one direction. The COICA
effectively creates a standard for trademarks infringement online that
has been embraced by the courts in a copyright context as it relates to
new technology. 10 8 It allows the Attorney General to determine
102. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
103. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103-10.
104. The overwhelming support for this Bill has come from members of the entertainment
industry. See Sam Gustin, Web Censorship Bill Sails through Senate Committee, WIRED (Nov.
18, 2010), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/l l/coica-web-censorship-bill/allIl (stating the
Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act is the latest effort by Hollywood, the
recording industry and the big media companies to stem the tidal wave of Internet file sharing).
105. See S. 3804, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
106. Id. at 18.
107. Id. at 15-17.
108. See generally Connie Davis Powell, The Saga Continues: Secondary Liability for
Copyright Infringement Theory, Practice and Predictions, 3 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 189
(2009) (discussing the evolution of secondary liability in a copyright context).
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whether infringing activity on a particular website is sufficient to fall
within the "dedicated to infringement" requirement of the COICA.'0 9
This concept flies in the face of the principles established in Inwood
and the other leading trademark decisions on secondary liability,
which require intent or knowledge and continued supply after
knowledge has been received.1 The COICA not only parts from the
basic principles of secondary liability in the Lanham Act context, but
also presents significant First Amendment concerns."' As such, it is
highly unlikely that the COICA will be enacted, and thusly never
address the problem for which it seeks to remedy.
VI. RECOMMENDATION AND FUTURE DIRECTION
The cases involving eBay, while they are less than optimal in
providing guidance, when coupled with existing provisions of the
Lanham Act, establish a roadmap for secondary trademark-liability
reform. This reform has the advantage of the "lessons learned" from
the implementation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA") and has the ability to be structured in a manner that avoids
the pitfalls of the DMCA. It is important to note that while this paper
focuses on Internet auctions and online marketplaces, the revisions
define "Internet Intermediaries" which encompasses Internet Auctions
as well as additional third-parties in an effort to provide all covered
entities a safe harbor.
A. The Recommendations for Safe Harbor Expansion
In reviewing, the case law, the Lanham Act and the COICA, it is
clear that the revisions to the Lanham Act are necessary to provide
certainty to online marketplaces and other third-party intermediaries
as to their liability for infringing activity contained on their sites. This
certainty is necessary to ensure the continued development of new
technologies and their uses to serve the ever-growing cyber-savvy
consumer. While the decisions in the eBay cases establish persuasive
authority that online marketplaces should not be held liable,' 12 clear
standards for a safe harbor for Internet intermediaries that expands the
109. SeeS. 3804, 111thCong. § 2, 18(2010).
110. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854, 860 (1982).
111. See generally Zoe Argento et al., The COICA Internet Censorship and Copyright Bill,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Nov. 16, 2010), https://www.eff.org/coica (follow Law
Professors' Letter Opposing COICA hyperlink) (discussing First Amendment implications).
112. See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1093-94 (C.D. Cal. 2001);
Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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innocent infringer concept to encompass those intermediaries that
have a viable notice and takedown system will provide the guidance
that is required.
Section 32(2)(B) of the Lanham Act reads as follows:
Where the infringement or violation complained of is contained in
or is part of paid advertising matter in a newspaper, magazine, or
other similar periodical or in an electronic communication as
defined in section 2510(12) of title 18, the remedies of the owner
of the right infringed or person bringing the action under section
1125(a) of this title as against the publisher or distributor of such
newspaper, magazine, or other similar periodical or electronic
communication shall be limited to an injunction against the
presentation of such advertising matter in future issues of such
newspapers, magazines, or other similar periodicals or in future
transmissions of such electronic communications. The limitations
of this subparagraph shall apply only to innocent infringers and
innocent violators.
i. Proposed Revisions
(4) An Internet intermediary shall not be liable for monetary
relief or, except as provided in subsection 2(B), for
injunctive or other equitable relief for infringement of
trademark if the Internet intermediary:
(A)
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an
activity using the material on the system or network is
infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is
apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
and
(B) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
paragraph (5), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable
113. 15U.S.C.§ 1114(2)(B)(2006).
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access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to
be the subject of infringing activity and provide verifiable
information on the user conducting the infringing activity,
including but not limited to verifiable contact information,
Internet Protocol address and any other such information
collected by Intermediary.
(5) Elements of Notification
To be effective under this subsection, a notification of
claimed infringement must be a written communication
provided to the designated agent of the Internet intermediary
that includes substantially the following:
(A)
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to
act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is
allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the trademark claimed to have been
infringed, or, if multiple trademarks at a single online site
are covered by a single notification, a representative list of
such infringements at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing
or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be
removed or access to which is to be disabled, and
information reasonably sufficient to permit the internet
intermediary to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the Internet
intermediary to contact the complaining party, such as an
address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic
mail address at which the complaining party may be
contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith
belief that use of the trademark is not authorized by the
trademark owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the complaining party has reviewed Section
1115(b)(4)-(5) and has a good faith belief that the use of the
2011]
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trademark does not constitute a fair use and
(vii)A statement that the information in the notification is
accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining
party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an
exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(B)
(i) Subject to clause (ii), a notification from a trademark owner
or from a person authorized to act on behalf of the
trademark owner that fails to comply substantially with the
provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be considered
under paragraph (])(A) in determining whether an Internet
intermediary has actual knowledge or is aware offacts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.
(ii) In a case in which the notification that is provided to the
Internet intermediary's designated agent fails to comply
substantially with all the provisions of subparagraph (A) but
substantially complies with clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) of
subparagraph (A), clause (i) of this subparagraph applies
only if the service provider promptly attempts to contact the
person making the notification or takes other reasonable
steps to assist in the receipt of notification that substantially
complies with all the provisions of subparagraph (A).
(C) as used in this subsection and subsection 4, the term Internet
intermediary means:
(i) Internet access and service providers (ISPs);
(ii) Data processing and web hosting providers, including
domain name registrars;
(iii) Internet search engines and portals;
(iv) E-commerce intermediaries, where these platforms do not
take title to the goods being sold,
(v) Internet payment systems; or
(vi) Participative networking platforms, which include Internet
publishing and broadcasting platforms that do not
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themselves create or own the content being published or
broadcast.
The proposed revision outlined above adds two additional
subsections to section 32. The new sections provide a definitive safe
harbor for Internet intermediaries and establish a notice and takedown
regime. This notice and takedown process mirrors the provisions in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1 4  with several major
distinctions. First, the proposed revision specifically requires that the
trademark holder affirm that alleged infringing use does not constitute
a fair use under the Lanham Act. The proposed revisions also define
notice sufficient to constitute "knowledge" on behalf of the Internet
intermediary. Additionally, "Internet intermediaries" is defined.
It is important at this juncture to discuss trademark fair use. The
revisions propose to place a requirement that trademark holders
affirm that the use as reported in the notice does not constitute a fair
use under the Lanham Act. 1 5 The right to restrict use of a trademark
by its owner is limited by a statutory affirmative defense to trademark
infringement-fair use. Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act provides
a defense for "a use, otherwise than as a mark.., of a term or device
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
describe the goods or services." ' 1 6 While a trademark conveys an
exclusive right to the use of a mark in commerce, the fair use doctrine
permits use of a trademark to describe certain aspects of the user's
own goods.117 "Where a trademark incorporates a term that is the only
reasonably available means of describing a characteristic of another's
goods, the other's use of that term in a descriptive sense is protected
by the fair use doctrine."
'
"
18
Fair use can be divided into two categories--classic and
nominative.' 19 Classic fair use generally occurs when a defendant uses
a plaintiffs trademark in order to describe his or her own product. 2°
114. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1998).
115. See infra Part V.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (2006).
117. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Trademarks and Tradenames § 142 (2011).
118. Id.
119. See New Kids On The Block v. News America Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992).
120. See id. at 306, 308.
If the defendant's use of the plaintiffs trademark refers to something other than
the plaintiff's product, the traditional fair use inquiry will continue to govern.
But, where the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff's product,
rather than its own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative
2011]
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The use of the trademark "Sweet Tarts" by Ocean Spray to describe
the taste of its cranberry juice is a typical example of classic fair
use. 121 The language in section 33(b)(4) has been characterized by at
least one circuit to require: (1) non-trademark use; (2)
descriptiveness; and (3) good faith use.12
2
Nominative fair use occurs when a defendant uses a plaintiffs
trademark to refer to the plaintiffs product. 123 Developed by the
Ninth Circuit in New Kids On The Block v. News America Publishing,
Inc., 24 the court generalized a group of cases in which the use of a
trademark "[did] not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or
to appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one. 125
According to the Ninth Circuit, nominative fair use is available when:
(1) the product is not readily identifiable without the use of the
trademark; (2) identifying the product, only so much of the mark as
reasonably necessary is used; and (3) no sponsorship or endorsement
by the trademark holder is suggested by the use. 126 The court also
reasoned that a great deal of worthwhile social and commercial
discourse would be rendered obsolete if "speakers were under threat
of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a
person, company or product by using its trademark.' ' 127 Nominative
fair use, coined and developed by the Ninth Circuit, is not a pervasive
concept. 28 The Second, Fifth and Sixth Circuits have referenced
nominative fair use, but have not treated the classification with as
much deference as the Ninth Circuit.129
fair use defense provided he meets the following three requirements.
Id. at 308.
121. See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 1995)
(finding that Ocean Spray's use of the trademark Sweet Tart to describe its own product's taste
was appropriate under classic fair use principles).
122. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir.
1992).
123. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
124. New Kids, 971 F.2d 302.
125. Id. at 308.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 307.
128. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 218 (3d Cir. 2005).
129. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the
district court had incorrectly applied the Ninth Circuit standard). See also, e.g., Pebble Beach
Co. v. Tour 18 1 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 n.13 (5th Cir. 1998) (adopting the Ninth Circuit's test
only in part); Interactive Prods. Corp. v. A2Z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 698
n.6 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing in a footnote why a district court case involving the nominative
fair use defense was distinguishable from the case before it); PACCAR Inc., v. TeleScan Techs.,
L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) (declining to follow the Ninth Circuit's analysis),
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While other circuits have not developed nominative fair use as
thoroughly as the Ninth Circuit, 130 the Third Circuit, in Century 21
Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc.,' 31 adopted the nominative fair
use classification and modified the Ninth Circuit's three-factor test.
32
The Third Circuit's test requires the defendant to show:
(1) [T]hat the use of plaintiffs mark is necessary to describe both
the plaintiff's product or service and the defendant's product or
service; (2) that the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiffs
mark as is necessary to describe plaintiff s product; and (3) that the
defendant's conduct or language reflect the true and accurate
relationship between plaintiff and defendant's products or
• 133
services.
Procedurally, it is important to note that the defendant is
generally responsible for raising and proving an affirmative
defense. 134 However, in trademark infringement cases, the circuits are
in disagreement as to how the fair use affirmative defense should
work in conjunction with the element of likelihood of confusion. 135
The Ninth Circuit held in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression 1, Inc. 136 that in nominative fair use cases, the
overruled by KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004);
Basic Fun, Inc. v. X-Concepts, L.L.C., 157 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating that
the Third Circuit does not recognize the 'nominative' fair use defense, as that is only used as a
separate defense in the Ninth Circuit).
130. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.
131. Century 21,425 F.3d at 216.
132. ld. at 222.
133. Id.
134. See Roy E. Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The burden
of pleading and proving an affirmative defense is on the party asserting it. Id. Accordingly, the
plaintiff is under no obligation to anticipate such a defense by stating in the complaint that the
defendant's activities do not satisfy the test for the affirmative defense. Id.
135. Compare KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that likelihood of confusion bars the fair use defense), overruled by KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004), and PACCAR
Inc., v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[A] finding of a likelihood
of confusion forecloses a fair use defense"), and Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc.,
698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) (alleged infringers were free to use words contained in a
trademark "in their ordinary, descriptive sense, so long as such use [did] not tend to confuse
customers as to the source of the goods"), with Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-
Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1997) (the fair use defense may succeed even if
there is likelihood of confusion), and Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America, Inc., 110
F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[A] determination of likely confusion [does not] preclud[e]
considering the fairness of use."), and Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d
1055, 1059 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that likelihood of confusion did not preclude the fair use
defense).
136. KPPermanent, 328 F.3d at 1072.
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likelihood of confusion element was replaced by the nominative fair
use three-factor test.137 The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the
Ninth Circuit's opinion, finding that based on the plain reading of the
Lanham Act, Congress placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove
likelihood of confusion as one of the main elements of a trademark
infringement claim. 138 Moreover, the Court opined that because
Congress was silent about confusion when discussing the fair use
defense, they did not intend to make it a requirement for fair use.
139
The Court also highlighted the conceptual difficulties of requiring a
defendant to negate elements of the cause of action in an affirmative
defense.
140
In so holding, the Court conceded that due to this rule, "it
follows.., that some possibility of consumer confusion must be
compatible with fair use, and so it is.' 4' Thus, confusion and fair use
are not mutually exclusive concepts. In certain situations, the plaintiff
will be able to successfully prove the confusion element for
infringement, but the fair use defense can still be raised
successfully. 142 In such cases, some confusion does not negate the
application of the fair use defense.
143
137. Id. (citing Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)) ("The
distinction between the two types of fair use is important because each type calls for a different
analysis. When analyzing nominative fair use, it is not necessary to address likelihood of
confusion because the nominative fair use analysis replaced the likelihood of confusion
analysis.").
138. KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 111 (2004).
139. Id. at 118.
It is just not plausible that Congress would have used the descriptive phrase
"likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake, or to deceive" in § 1114 to
describe the requirement that a mark owner show likelihood of consumer
confusion, but would have relied on the phrase "used fairly" § 1115(b)(4) in a fit
of terse drafting meant to place a defendant under a burden to negate confusion.
Id.
140. See id. at 120.
[I]t would make no sense to give the defendant a defense of showing
affirmatively that the plaintiff cannot succeed in proving some element (like
confusion); all the defendant needs to do is to leave the factfinder unpersuaded
that the plaintiff has carried its own burden on that point. A defendant has no
need of a court's true belief when agnosticism will do.
Id.
141. Id. at 121-22.
142. See id. at 120.
143. See id. at 122, 123.
The common law's tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of the
consumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an originally
descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the
undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a
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One very notable aspect of the Supreme Court's opinion in KP
Permanent is that the opinion successfully sidestepped clarifying
whether the role of likelihood of confusion was different depending
on whether a classic or nominative fair use defense was raised." 44 Did
the Supreme Court's opinion in KP Permanent apply to both classic
and nominative fair use defenses? The Third Circuit arguably
resolved this question in Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
LendingTree, Inc. 145 In light of this, the court extended the Supreme
Court's ruling in KP Permanent to nominative fair use defenses.
46
The court focused on the conceptual difficulties of relieving a plaintiff
of the burden of proving the key element of a trademark infringement
case. 147
Based on Century 21 and KP Permanent, the courts have moved
in the direction of requiring a more traditional cause of action and
affirmative defense relationship for trademark infringement and fair
use. 148 Most recently, the Second Circuit in Tiffany 149 articulated a
simplified test for nominative fair use, a "defendant may lawfully use
a plaintiffs trademark where doing so is necessary to describe the
plaintiffs product and does not imply a false affiliation or
endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant."'150 However, the
Second Circuit, in its opinion successfully sidestepped a clear
articulation of the "rule" with respect to the likelihood of confusion
and nominative fair use. Regardless of the kind of fair use at issue,
taking these cases together, the likelihood of confusion is an element
relegated to the plaintiff.
descriptive term simply by grabbing it first.
Id. at 122.
144. See id at 115 n.3 ("Nor do we address the Court of Appeals' discussion of
'nominative fair use."').
145. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2005).
146. See id. at 220-22.
Today we adopt a two-step approach in nominative fair use cases. The plaintiff
must first prove that confusion is likely due to the defendant's use of the
plaintiffs mark.... Once plaintiff has met its burden of proving that confusion is
likely, the burden then shifts to defendant to show that its nominative use of
plaintiff's mark is nonetheless fair.
Id. at 220.
147. Id. at 221.
148. See id.
149. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
150. Id. at 102-03.
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B. Recommendation for Revisions to Fair Use
This section provides recommended revisions to sections
33(b)(4) and 32(2)(B) of the Lanham Act.
Section 33(b)(4) currently reads as follows:
"That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's
individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of
anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin."'
5
'1
151. 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (2006).
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i. Proposed Revision
(4) That the use of the name, term or device charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the
party's individual name in his own business or of the
individual name of anyone in privity with such a party; or
(5) That the use of the name, term or device charged to be an
infringement is a classic or nominative fair use.
(a) Classic fair use occurs if.-
1. defendant's use of the name, term or device is not as a
trademark or service mark, and
2. is used fairly in good faith; and
3. is only used to describe the goods or services of such
party; and
4. does not render substantial harm to the trademarks
viability in the marketplace.
(b) Nominative fair use occurs if.-
1. use is necessary to describe both the plaintiff's product
or service and the defendant's product or service; and
2. is used in a limited manner only to describe the
plaintiff's product; and
3. the defendant's conduct or language reflects the true
and accurate relationship between plaintiff and
defendant's products or services.
The proposed revision separates section 33(b)(4) into two parts:
one focusing on the same name use and the other focusing on classic
and nominative fair use. The classic fair use test includes three factors
that the courts have repeatedly identified in addition to a fourth factor
that addresses the growing concern that the classic fair use defense
will get out of hand now that defendants do not have to prove there is
no likelihood of confusion. 52 This fourth element serves as a safety
152. See generally Michael Fuller, "Fair Use" Trumps Likelihood of Confusion in
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valve to ensure that the classic fair use defense is not being used to
disproportionately harm the plaintiff. The nominative fair use revision
is directly from the Third Circuit case Century 21.153 This test further
develops the original Ninth Circuit test substantially and makes clear
that the likelihood of confusion is not an element of the nominative
fair use defense.
54
The revisions to the Lanham Act proposed in this section are
consistent with the most current precedent. In addition to being
consistent with current precedent, the proposed revisions address
several issues left open by precedent. Specifically, (1) the revisions
clearly define the role of likelihood of confusion in a fair use defense,
(2) provide the notice sufficient to establish "knowledge," and (3)
establish procedures that Intemet intermediaries must follow in order
to avoid liability once such notice is received.
While these recommendations provide a structured and
principled scheme for determining when liability will attach to an
online marketplace or other intermediary, there is no doubt potential
criticism for the recommendations. First, with respect to the online
marketplaces, while these recommendations provide a safe harbor,
they also require that the marketplaces and intermediaries develop a
viable notice of infringement and take down system. In addition, the
revisions require that the online marketplace or intermediary obtain
"verifiable" information from all users. As one might imagine, there
will be some resistance, mainly based upon the cost associated with
the implementation of the requirements. However, looking to the
DMCA requirements, it appears that notice and takedown systems are
effective. Moreover, requiring verifiable information for use will
enable the online marketplaces to effectuate their policies more
efficiently as well. However, when using the DMCA as a guide, one
must take into consideration the criticism of the DMCA. Much
criticism has revolved around the DMCA's potential for abuse
because fair use exceptions are not factored into the system.' The
revision as proposed in this paper takes into consideration these
objections with the revisions to the fair use section of the Lanham Act
and the requirement that a trademark holder must first determine if
Trademark Law; The Supreme Court Rules in KP Permanent v. Lasting Impression, B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://www.bc.edubc org/avp/law/storg/iptf/articles/index.html.
153. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211,222 (3d Cir. 2005).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, DMCA Critics Say Reform Still Needed, CNET NEWS
(Dec. 17, 2002), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-978296.html.
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fair use prior to submitting a notice under the revisions. These
revisions will cause some consternation amongst trademark holders.
First, trademark holders will contend that the revisions to the
definition of fair use will be costly and difficult to implement. Next,
the contention is that determining both marketplace viability and
whether a true and accurate depiction of the mark is present will be
onerous. The revisions as proposed do not deviate substantially from
the traditional requirement of fair use. The requirement under the
proposed revisions is a good faith determination that fair use is not
implicated. Thus, requiring the trademark holder prior to submitting a
notice to review the standards and make a determination should be no
different that the initial evaluation undertaken when a trademark
holder sends a cease and desist. The proposal as submitted in this
Article does not require the trademark holder to be correct in its
review, but merely that they have considered the standards and the
standards are not applicable.
VII.CONCLUSION
Trademark law is at a juncture where technology may be stifled
if the laws are not adjusted to balance the interests of the innovators
and the trademark owners. Trademark owners are filing direct
infringement actions against Internet intermediaries secondary
infringement actions for the sale of counterfeit merchandise by users
of the technology. While many legal scholars have discussed one of
the dilemmas of trademark infringement, regarding what constitute
trademark use, 156 in order to fashion liability, it is time to shift the
focus from infringement to creating a safe harbor for Internet
intermediaries. As can be discerned from the discussion above, the
current trademark regime is fractured. Indeed, to reach any conclusion
on a claim of infringement by an Internet intermediary, a court has to
do a dance more intricate than the tango. Notwithstanding, the
Lanham Act and the case law provide a roadmap for reform.
Similarly, the legislature must perform an intricate dance to ensure
that the parties' interests are balanced. This dance will require
revisions as recommended above to the Lanham Act that does not
two-step the issue of the role of the "likelihood of confusion" in fair
use defense and expands the current safe harbor to include immunity
from liability when there is a notice and takedown system in place.
156. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1669, 1670 (2007).
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